Seneca,

It’s easier to accept that all the virtues are equal, probably because we’re less familiar with them.  When we hear that a white lie we make casually is akin to murder, we shy away.  Probably because we’re far more familiar with the “little evil.”  But there’s no such case, because that lie in fact murders our character.

Worse yet, we have trained our moral will, or προαίρεσις, to make such choices in the future.

“Any man who believes them to be unequal is turning away from the virtues themselves and is surveying mere externals; true goods have the same weight and the same width.”

This small selection is worth of pointing out, and contemplating frequently.

Farewell.

Part of Michel Daw’s Reading Plan of Seneca’s Letters.

Seneca,

“Reason, however, is nothing else than a portion of the divine spirit set in a human body.  If reason is divine, and the good in no case lacks reason, then the good in every case is divine. And furthermore, there is no distinction between things divine; hence there is none between goods, either.”

Every once in a while, I think I’m starting to get a handle on what Stoic virtue is.  Of course, I know the pat definitions… but really understanding it?  No, not yet.

I was thinking the other day on progress, and how if we Stoics had a conception of heretical doctrines, I subscribe to two of them.  The one is essay-fodder for a later date, but the other is the idea of progress.

I wrote about it yesterday, making a case for progress in Stoicism.  but this morning I was thinking about it, and I realized that this is not a position I can reasonably disagree with yet.  I might not like it, but I don’t have grounds to disagree with it.

I’ve read that’s probable that the folks of the Early Stoa (Zeno, Cleanthes, Chryssipus) likely believed themselves to be Sages, but sometime between then and the Late, Roman Stoa, the idea of of the Sage had changed somewhat, and our sources seem to no longer believe themselves (and probably not the Early Stoa as well) to be Sages.  We see that in the comments that say we have not yet seen a Sage.

My suspicion i that the Early Stoa, still being heavily influenced by Zeno’s Cynicism, saw a more practical virtue.  Cynic virtue seems easier to attain than the Stoic conception of it.

Which brings me back  to my disagreement on progress.  I don’t like the idea of no progress, the true binary and “road to Damascus”-style conversion to wisdom.

But I haven’t been there.  Without having been there, how can I saw the path looks different than others have said it does?  I’ll have to suspend judgment on the issue of progress for the time being.

Maybe sometime in the few weeks we’ll look at the other “Stoic heresy” that I favor.  (;

Farewell.

Part of Michel Daw’s Reading Plan of Seneca’s Letters.

Seneca,

The discussion of virtue is one which is interesting.  It’s difficult sometimes to grok the concept.  Like your example of a household or person being dyed in the quality of virtue, our modern conception of virtue is dyed in the Abrahamic context of the previous two millennia.

The Stoic position of a hard binary between virtue and vice, with no admission of progress is a tough hurdle.  It also seems to belie the experience of most folks.  We can see changes in our thinking, our actions, our intent.  We can see how we handle impressions differently.  Yet, this is no progress?

We can see ourselves renouncing the apparent goods of the world, with our attentions focused on what’s “up to us.”  Yet, this is no progress?

I see your point that what is perfect cannot be made better, and if better occurs, it’s because some defect was present — but here eve we see a change towards the good.  Why not call this progress?

The lack of progress produces a sense of urgency, but the non-Sage sometimes likes gold stars for good work, and a pat on the end.  Of course, the Sage would not need these things…

Farewell.

Part of Michel Daw’s Reading Plan of Seneca’s Letters.