SLRP: LXVI. On Various Aspects Of Virtue (Part 3: 21 – 30)

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Seneca,

It’s easier to accept that all the virtues are equal, probably because we’re less familiar with them.  When we hear that a white lie we make casually is akin to murder, we shy away.  Probably because we’re far more familiar with the “little evil.”  But there’s no such case, because that lie in fact murders our character.

Worse yet, we have trained our moral will, or προαίρεσις, to make such choices in the future.

“Any man who believes them to be unequal is turning away from the virtues themselves and is surveying mere externals; true goods have the same weight and the same width.”

This small selection is worth of pointing out, and contemplating frequently.

Farewell.

Part of Michel Daw’s Reading Plan of Seneca’s Letters.

CERP: Day 46 – Heraclitus Ep. 7, part 2.

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VII. To Hermodorus Part 2 (p. 205-207)
This epistle seems to touch upon some Cynic themes.  Everything in human civilization is contrary to nature.  At all times injustice is the rule and inspiration for all manner of human action.  Heraclitus cannot help but weep in the face of such an atrocity.

Generally, I’m surprised to find these Heraclitus letters in the volume, they seem to be an outlier.  But this one seems more firmly in the vein of “City of Pera.”

 

This is part of the Cynic Epistles Reading Plan.

SLRP: LXVI. On Various Aspects Of Virtue (Part 2: 10 – 20)

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Seneca,

“Reason, however, is nothing else than a portion of the divine spirit set in a human body.  If reason is divine, and the good in no case lacks reason, then the good in every case is divine. And furthermore, there is no distinction between things divine; hence there is none between goods, either.”

Every once in a while, I think I’m starting to get a handle on what Stoic virtue is.  Of course, I know the pat definitions… but really understanding it?  No, not yet.

I was thinking the other day on progress, and how if we Stoics had a conception of heretical doctrines, I subscribe to two of them.  The one is essay-fodder for a later date, but the other is the idea of progress.

I wrote about it yesterday, making a case for progress in Stoicism.  but this morning I was thinking about it, and I realized that this is not a position I can reasonably disagree with yet.  I might not like it, but I don’t have grounds to disagree with it.

I’ve read that’s probable that the folks of the Early Stoa (Zeno, Cleanthes, Chryssipus) likely believed themselves to be Sages, but sometime between then and the Late, Roman Stoa, the idea of of the Sage had changed somewhat, and our sources seem to no longer believe themselves (and probably not the Early Stoa as well) to be Sages.  We see that in the comments that say we have not yet seen a Sage.

My suspicion i that the Early Stoa, still being heavily influenced by Zeno’s Cynicism, saw a more practical virtue.  Cynic virtue seems easier to attain than the Stoic conception of it.

Which brings me back  to my disagreement on progress.  I don’t like the idea of no progress, the true binary and “road to Damascus”-style conversion to wisdom.

But I haven’t been there.  Without having been there, how can I saw the path looks different than others have said it does?  I’ll have to suspend judgment on the issue of progress for the time being.

Maybe sometime in the few weeks we’ll look at the other “Stoic heresy” that I favor.  (;

Farewell.

 

Part of Michel Daw’s Reading Plan of Seneca’s Letters.

CERP: Day 45 – Heraclitus Ep. 7.

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VII. To Hermodorus Part 1 (p. 201-203)
Interesting that in Heraclitus’ time, they had activist judges as well!  The Ps-Heraclitus sets up the Ephesians as a vicious people, whose city is rife with all manner of disgrace.

He lists a series of them: gluttony, rapine, promiscuity, faithlessness, and more besides.

The hallmark being that while city itself is steeped in evil, the purpose of the judge is to banish the one who shows it for what it is.  But the Ps-Heraclitus is not himself a judge:  he’s a mirror.  His dour countenance is not born of ill will, but is formed by the quality of the people.  He’s a mirror, not a scale.

 

This is part of the Cynic Epistles Reading Plan.

SLRP: LXVI. On Various Aspects Of Virtue (Part 1: 1 – 9)

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Seneca,

The discussion of virtue is one which is interesting.  It’s difficult sometimes to grok the concept.  Like your example of a household or person being dyed in the quality of virtue, our modern conception of virtue is dyed in the Abrahamic context of the previous two millennia.

The Stoic position of a hard binary between virtue and vice, with no admission of progress is a tough hurdle.  It also seems to belie the experience of most folks.  We can see changes in our thinking, our actions, our intent.  We can see how we handle impressions differently.  Yet, this is no progress?

We can see ourselves renouncing the apparent goods of the world, with our attentions focused on what’s “up to us.”  Yet, this is no progress?

I see your point that what is perfect cannot be made better, and if better occurs, it’s because some defect was present — but here eve we see a change towards the good.  Why not call this progress?

The lack of progress produces a sense of urgency, but the non-Sage sometimes likes gold stars for good work, and a pat on the end.  Of course, the Sage would not need these things…

Farewell.

 

Part of Michel Daw’s Reading Plan of Seneca’s Letters.

New Translation of Epictetus

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While I’ve been putting together those YouTube videos of the Enchiridion with Jean, he pointed me to a new translation of the works of Epictetus that I previously hadn’t been exposed to.dairesis

Franco Scalenghe runs http://www.epitteto.com/ and you can download as PDF or read as hypertext his new translation of the Enchiridion, Discourses, and Fragments.  Franco’s translation attempts to keep the conversational style of the Discourses alive, in a way that some of the translations from the 20th or 19th centuries may lack for modern readers.

I’m working Franco’s translation now, and it’s an exciting new light in which to view Epictetus.  I suspect it will get a permanent place right next to the Higginson translation for me.

Stoicism, homosexuality, trans persons, and “effeminate men.”

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This issue is a sensitive one.  A recent, and in many cases current, history of aggression, abuse, violence, and more has made this a debate topic which is heated.  The mere discussion can be interpreted as a challenge to identity, personhood, and more.  I’m hoping that as philosophers we can by-pass the majority of that nastiness.  That being said …

One of the things that I’ve been thinking about in my study of Stoicism deals with sex and gender.  Musonius has a very forward thinking position on men and women regarding education (Lecture 3), in that he argues while their bodies are different their souls and reason are of the same sort.  Despite this, Musonius is not a feminist in the way most folks understand that word today.  He sees a division of labor (Lecture 4), for instance, as a natural feature of human society.  This sort of biological determinism (if that’s a thing), I suspect is unacceptable to modern, third-wave feminists.

Musonius (Lectures 1 and 2) and Epictetus (Discourses 2.16 and 3.24) use the word “effeminate” as a pejorative or at least as a harsh criticism. The word in 2.16 is μαλακία, which can also be translated as ‘softness.’   Every translation I’ve seen uses the word “effeminacy” here, however.  And in 3.24 is ἀποθηλύνω, which can be “to make effeminate, to enervate, or to weaken.”  One might conclude that there are some negative value judgments being implied here.

Their position is that male and female are static categories, binaries.  However, the lesson I’ve taken from the works (an interpretation, clearly) is somewhat different than the one a cursory textual reading might leave the reader with.

Let’s look at an example, both teachers discuss the beard.  By my reading, both Musonius and Epictetus see the male beard as formed by nature, that is God, the ordering principle of the universe. To remove it, then, is impious.  Their position is that the bodies of men and women are formed to specific purposes, and to alter that is not man’s role.

It’s not bad to be womanish if one is a woman, I think they would say, if asked. As men, philosophers should not remove a part of the body for mere fashion.  They say something like, “to be smooth is a woman’s nature, whereas hair suits a man.”  While most men are generally more hirsute than are women, women of course are not hairless.  There is a spectrum of hair growth for humans.

If you’ll permit some paraphrasing and reducing, then the general rule here is that treatment of the body and one’s role in society based on it contribute to piety/impiety.

The ancients’ views on sex, gender, and what constitutes “natural” are admittedly different than the general Western conception today.  That presents an issue with which we must wrangle.  We must reconcile the two, somehow.

Their position is complicated. Male homosexual activity is mentioned in the Discourses and Cynic Epistles pretty casually.  It doesn’t’ appear to be too much of an issue.  I’m not sure, though, that any modern conception of an LGBTQ person fits neatly into these ancient ideas.  Which leads to the question, what does the modern conception of homosexuality and the issues facing trans folks mean for modern Stoics using ancient texts? I’m not sure, but I’m positive the debate would be useful, if not easy. It’s probably one the Stoic community should have.

If we read in Musonius and Epictetus that one shouldn’t cut off the beard due to impiety, what does that mean for someone transitioning from male to female or female to male?  What does that mean for folks who identify as non-binary?

The classics’ opinions seem at odds with ours, and it’s one of those things we have to weigh, test and then either accept, modify, or cast aside.  We lack a 2300 year tradition, we’re all trying to incorporate ideas over an 1800 year gap.  That’s messy.

My personal leanings are “personal choices, personal nature, and virtue are up to the individual,” and to leave it at that.  People I’m close to have had to handle these issues themselves within the wider western culture, but I’ve not spoken with someone who ascribes to Stoic philosophy and also handles these issues on a personal level.  I can see why my position of “it’s basically not ‘up to me’ ” might seem unfulfilling, or maybe even a cop-out of sorts.  That’s not my intent.

One of the things about Stoicism which is attractive is its openness.  We’re not going to kick someone out of the Stoic tent for this person’s or that person’s perception of a violation of what Epictetus or Musonius says.  That kind of enforcing of moral prescriptions is not what we’re doing here.

I don’t recall any others tackling this issue head-on, and I’m interested in other folks’ thoughts.

CERP: Day 44 – Heraclitus Ep. 6.

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VI. To the Same (p. 197)
I wonder if Heraclitus would be an anti-vaccine kind of guy today?  In all seriousness, the thing this Epistle brings to mind is the danger of what is being called (despite my distaste for the word) “scientism.”  Science, and from this we may also say bio-medicine, is a very good tool for a certain jobs.  But, like any tool, it has a proper use, a proper application, a proper context, and a proper time.  You won’t find a screw driver too much use if you need to remove a bolt, for instance.

Science is a very good way for understanding the mechanics of the world.  There’s a position called “scientific pessimism” which is explained by this:  if you piled up all the things we now know to be wrong which science once believed to be true, it would tower over the things we know to be so.  What might we have to move from the small pile to the big one tomorrow?

This should not be used to discount current findings, but it should be a humbling reminder of how falsification works.  Science doesn’t tell us true things, it remove the false.  It tells us the how, not the why.

Epictetus makes an argument about faculties, that only reason observes itself.  Music tells you about harmony, how to make chords, tones and steps, etc.  But it doesn’t tell you if you should play, only how.  Grammar tells you the proper syntax, conjugations and declensions.  But not whether you ought to speak or write.

Science, then, is similar.  There are things beyond its purview:  and thence comes philosophy.  The folks who have neglected its proper place, and think it can simply be used as an ethic or mode of life are mistaken.  To their detriment.

 

This is part of the Cynic Epistles Reading Plan.